Abstract
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two standard models: (i) the marriage model due to Gale and Shapley and (ii) the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik. Recently, Eriksson and Karlander introduced a hybrid model, which was further generalized by Sotomayor. In this paper, we propose a common generalization of these models by utilizing the framework of discrete convex analysis introduced by Murota, and verify the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome in our general model.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 950-970 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Discrete Applied Mathematics |
Volume | 154 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2006 Apr 15 |
Keywords
- Assignment model
- Discrete convex analysis
- M#-concave function
- Marriage model
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics
- Applied Mathematics