A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions

Satoru Fujishige, Akihisa Tamura

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)


In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two standard models: (i) the marriage model due to Gale and Shapley and (ii) the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik. Recently, Eriksson and Karlander introduced a hybrid model, which was further generalized by Sotomayor. In this paper, we propose a common generalization of these models by utilizing the framework of discrete convex analysis introduced by Murota, and verify the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome in our general model.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)950-970
Number of pages21
JournalDiscrete Applied Mathematics
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - 2006 Apr 15


  • Assignment model
  • Discrete convex analysis
  • M#-concave function
  • Marriage model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics
  • Applied Mathematics


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