TY - JOUR
T1 - A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment
AU - Guerci, Eric
AU - Hanaki, Nobuyuki
AU - Watanabe, Naoki
AU - Esposito, Gabriele
AU - Lu, Xiaoyan
N1 - Funding Information:
This paper is a revised version of our earlier work “A Note on the Experiments of Weighted Voting: Human Mistakes in Cooperative Games” presented at TCER conference 2011. We have greatly benefited from comments and suggestions from Maria Montero and Yoichi Hizen. A part of this research was conducted while Hanaki was visiting the Higher School of Economics (Moscow). We have benefited from discussion with Fuad Aleskerov and Alexis Beliani. The Experimental Economics Lab at Montpellier (LAMETA), in particular, Dimitri Dubois, has kindly hosted us for running this experiment. Financial support from IEF Marie Curie research fellowship n.237633-MMI (Guerci), Japan Economic Research Foundation (Hanaki), MEXT Grants-in-Aid 20330037, 24330078, and 25380222, (Watanabe), and JSPS-CNRS bilateral research project, JSPS-ANR bilateral research project “BECOA” (ANR-11-FRJA-0002) are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed are purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
PY - 2014/11/20
Y1 - 2014/11/20
N2 - We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69–87, 2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role (FR)] and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve [multiple approval (MA) vs. single approval (SA)]. It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as well as how negotiations proceed. 3-player MWCs were more frequently observed, negotiations were much longer, subjects made less mistakes, and proposal-objection dynamics were more frequently observed, under the protocol with FR and SA than under the protocol with RR and MA.
AB - We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69–87, 2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role (FR)] and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve [multiple approval (MA) vs. single approval (SA)]. It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as well as how negotiations proceed. 3-player MWCs were more frequently observed, negotiations were much longer, subjects made less mistakes, and proposal-objection dynamics were more frequently observed, under the protocol with FR and SA than under the protocol with RR and MA.
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-014-0814-y
DO - 10.1007/s00355-014-0814-y
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84911953726
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 43
SP - 827
EP - 850
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 4
ER -