A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods

Keisuke Bando, Kenzo Imamura

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider an allocation problem with indivisible goods, and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonic allocation rules under non-wastefulness. The condition is based on robustness to group manipulation. Specifically, we introduce a new condition called the no improvement property of unmatched agents which means that unmatched agents cannot be strictly better off through any group manipulation. We show that a non-wasteful allocation rule satisfies weak Maskin monotonicity if and only if it satisfies the no improvement property of unmatched agents and weak group strategy-proofness. In addition, together with our result and that of Kojima and Manea (Econometrica 78:633–653, 2010), the deferred acceptance (DA) rules with acceptant substitutable priorities are characterized based on the conditions related to robustness to group manipulation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)589-606
Number of pages18
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume47
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Oct 1
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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