TY - JOUR
T1 - Allocation and architecture in climate governance beyond Kyoto
T2 - Lessons from interdisciplinary research on target setting
AU - Kanie, Norichika
AU - Nishimoto, Hiromi
AU - Hijioka, Yasuaki
AU - Kameyama, Yasuko
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments We are grateful for the funding provided by the Environment Research and Technology Development Fund (S-6) of the Ministry of Environment, Japan, and the Mitsui & Co., Ltd. Environmental Fund. Norichika Kanie thanks IDDRI and SciencesPo Paris for their congenial support. We are grateful to the two anonymous reviewers as well as to Frank Biermann and Ruben Zondervan for comments on earlier drafts of this article.
PY - 2010/12
Y1 - 2010/12
N2 - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change envisions that all countries will follow the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibility' in terms of their responsibility to protect the earth's climate system. However, its concrete application has always been controversial. The Kyoto Protocol framed this allocation issue in terms of quantified emission reduction and limitation objectives (QERLOs) in its Annex B, but this also triggered the refusal of the United States to ratify the Protocol. This article identifies some of the problems associated with allocation, and its problems inter-linked with governance architecture, by examining the case of the allocation of reduction commitments for greenhouse gas emissions in the context of climate governance beyond 2012. Three broad criteria are used in the discussion, namely, responsibility, capability, and efficiency. Target numbers for individual countries differ with the criteria used, but they also differ even within the same criteria category, due to different ways these conceptual criteria are translated into quantitative calculation formulas. Sometimes this makes a large difference for individual targets. Our calculations using different criteria and formula to come up with medium-term targets for selected developed countries show that differences in results are caused by the choice of allocation principle, differences in allocation formula under a given allocation principle, and different calculation criteria used under a given allocation formula. Assumptions in modeling and the choice of data also affect results. Importantly, interests are often embedded explicitly or implicitly behind these different ideas. Although allocation and architecture seems to be different problems of governance. at first glance, there is also a link between limited data availability for allocation calculations and the form of governance architecture proposed. This is an area where further scientific research is required.
AB - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change envisions that all countries will follow the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibility' in terms of their responsibility to protect the earth's climate system. However, its concrete application has always been controversial. The Kyoto Protocol framed this allocation issue in terms of quantified emission reduction and limitation objectives (QERLOs) in its Annex B, but this also triggered the refusal of the United States to ratify the Protocol. This article identifies some of the problems associated with allocation, and its problems inter-linked with governance architecture, by examining the case of the allocation of reduction commitments for greenhouse gas emissions in the context of climate governance beyond 2012. Three broad criteria are used in the discussion, namely, responsibility, capability, and efficiency. Target numbers for individual countries differ with the criteria used, but they also differ even within the same criteria category, due to different ways these conceptual criteria are translated into quantitative calculation formulas. Sometimes this makes a large difference for individual targets. Our calculations using different criteria and formula to come up with medium-term targets for selected developed countries show that differences in results are caused by the choice of allocation principle, differences in allocation formula under a given allocation principle, and different calculation criteria used under a given allocation formula. Assumptions in modeling and the choice of data also affect results. Importantly, interests are often embedded explicitly or implicitly behind these different ideas. Although allocation and architecture seems to be different problems of governance. at first glance, there is also a link between limited data availability for allocation calculations and the form of governance architecture proposed. This is an area where further scientific research is required.
KW - Allocation
KW - Architecture
KW - Greenhouse gas emission reduction
KW - Mid-term target
KW - Quantified Emission Reduction and Limitation Objectives (QERLOs)
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U2 - 10.1007/s10784-010-9143-5
DO - 10.1007/s10784-010-9143-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:78149495767
SN - 1567-9764
VL - 10
SP - 299
EP - 315
JO - International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
JF - International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
IS - 4
ER -