TY - JOUR
T1 - An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
T2 - Comment
AU - Okamoto, Noriaki
N1 - Funding Information:
Okamoto’s research is financially supported by the Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows (15J06887) and Keio Economic Society.
PY - 2018/2
Y1 - 2018/2
N2 - Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium.
AB - Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85041367061&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85041367061&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1257/aer.20160970
DO - 10.1257/aer.20160970
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85041367061
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 108
SP - 555
EP - 560
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 2
ER -