An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

Noriaki Okamoto

doi:10.1257/aer.20160970

An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

Noriaki Okamoto

Faculty of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	555-560
Number of pages	6
Journal	American Economic Review
Volume	108
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160970
Publication status	Published - 2018 Feb

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1257/aer.20160970

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An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

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