TY - JOUR
T1 - Asymmetry of customer loss and recovery under endogenous partnerships
T2 - Theory and evidence
AU - Fujiwara-Greve, Takako
AU - Greve, Henrich R.
AU - Jonsson, Stefan
PY - 2016/2/1
Y1 - 2016/2/1
N2 - This article is inspired by real-world phenomena that firms lose customers based on imprecise information and take a long time to recover. If consumers are playing an ordinary repeated game with fixed partners, there is no clear reason why recovery happens slowly. However, if consumers are playing an endogenously repeated game, a class of simple efficient equilibria exhibits the asymmetry of fast loss and slow recovery of customers after a bad signal. Exit is systematic, but formation of a new partnership is random. We also give empirical evidence of our equilibria at an individual-firm level.
AB - This article is inspired by real-world phenomena that firms lose customers based on imprecise information and take a long time to recover. If consumers are playing an ordinary repeated game with fixed partners, there is no clear reason why recovery happens slowly. However, if consumers are playing an endogenously repeated game, a class of simple efficient equilibria exhibits the asymmetry of fast loss and slow recovery of customers after a bad signal. Exit is systematic, but formation of a new partnership is random. We also give empirical evidence of our equilibria at an individual-firm level.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84958777360&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84958777360&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/iere.12146
DO - 10.1111/iere.12146
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84958777360
SN - 0020-6598
VL - 57
SP - 3
EP - 30
JO - International Economic Review
JF - International Economic Review
IS - 1
ER -