Abstract
In single-item auctions, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-imposition if and only if it is either a second price auction with a reserve price or the no-trade rule. In this characterization, any reserve price is endogenously derived from the three axioms. We also analyze relations between equity and efficiency axioms, and obtain alternative characterizations.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 255-265 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | International Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 Sept |
Keywords
- Market design
- No-trade rule
- Reserve price
- Second price auction
- Strategy-proofness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics