BGP integrity check for the conflict origin AS prefix in the Inter-domain routing

K. Nagahashi; H. Esaki; J. Murai

doi:10.1109/SAINT.2003.1183060

BGP integrity check for the conflict origin AS prefix in the Inter-domain routing

K. Nagahashi, H. Esaki, J. Murai

Faculty of Environment and Information Studies

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

On the current Internet, the routing architecture consists of intra-domain routing and inter-domain routing. For inter-domain routing an autonomous system (AS), represents the administrative network domain, which is managed by a single institution with its operational policy. ASs exchange AS reachability information with each other. Without inter-domain routing, all nodes on the Internet cannot communicate across multiple ASs. Therefore, inter-domain routing is an essential element in global Internet operation. However, due to several reasons such as miss-configuration on the routers, it often happens that one AS (say AS1) propagates the prefix that has been already assigned to another AS (say AS2) and other peers receive its routing prefix update from AS2 and inject the misconfigured AS information to their peering routers. Since the routing information associated with AS1 is overwritten by AS2, AS1 loses network reachability. This problem is known as the conflict origin AS prefix or the multiple origin AS (MOAS). We recognize that this is a severe problem which degrades the quality of Internet backbone infrastructure. We focus on this problem and propose a mechanism that can detect the conflict origin AS prefix automatically using the policy database.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003
Editors	Jun Murai, Carl Chang, Yuji Oie, Sumi Helal
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	276-282
Number of pages	7
ISBN (Electronic)	0769518729, 9780769518725
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/SAINT.2003.1183060
Publication status	Published - 2003 Jan 1
Event	2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003 - Orlando, United States Duration: 2003 Jan 27 → 2003 Jan 31

Publication series

Name	Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003

Other

Other	2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003
Country/Territory	United States
City	Orlando
Period	03/1/27 → 03/1/31

Keywords

Context-aware services
Convergence
Databases
Degradation
Delay
Internet
Network topology
Peer to peer computing
Routing protocols
Spine

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science Applications
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Hardware and Architecture

Access to Document

10.1109/SAINT.2003.1183060

Cite this

Nagahashi, K., Esaki, H., & Murai, J. (2003). BGP integrity check for the conflict origin AS prefix in the Inter-domain routing. In J. Murai, C. Chang, Y. Oie, & S. Helal (Eds.), Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003 (pp. 276-282). Article 1183060 (Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SAINT.2003.1183060

BGP integrity check for the conflict origin AS prefix in the Inter-domain routing. / Nagahashi, K.; Esaki, H.; Murai, J.
Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003. ed. / Jun Murai; Carl Chang; Yuji Oie; Sumi Helal. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2003. p. 276-282 1183060 (Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Nagahashi, K, Esaki, H & Murai, J 2003, BGP integrity check for the conflict origin AS prefix in the Inter-domain routing. in J Murai, C Chang, Y Oie & S Helal (eds), Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003., 1183060, Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 276-282, 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003, Orlando, United States, 03/1/27. https://doi.org/10.1109/SAINT.2003.1183060

Nagahashi K, Esaki H, Murai J. BGP integrity check for the conflict origin AS prefix in the Inter-domain routing. In Murai J, Chang C, Oie Y, Helal S, editors, Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2003. p. 276-282. 1183060. (Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003). doi: 10.1109/SAINT.2003.1183060

Nagahashi, K. ; Esaki, H. ; Murai, J. / BGP integrity check for the conflict origin AS prefix in the Inter-domain routing. Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003. editor / Jun Murai ; Carl Chang ; Yuji Oie ; Sumi Helal. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2003. pp. 276-282 (Proceedings - 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet, SAINT 2003).

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AB - On the current Internet, the routing architecture consists of intra-domain routing and inter-domain routing. For inter-domain routing an autonomous system (AS), represents the administrative network domain, which is managed by a single institution with its operational policy. ASs exchange AS reachability information with each other. Without inter-domain routing, all nodes on the Internet cannot communicate across multiple ASs. Therefore, inter-domain routing is an essential element in global Internet operation. However, due to several reasons such as miss-configuration on the routers, it often happens that one AS (say AS1) propagates the prefix that has been already assigned to another AS (say AS2) and other peers receive its routing prefix update from AS2 and inject the misconfigured AS information to their peering routers. Since the routing information associated with AS1 is overwritten by AS2, AS1 loses network reachability. This problem is known as the conflict origin AS prefix or the multiple origin AS (MOAS). We recognize that this is a severe problem which degrades the quality of Internet backbone infrastructure. We focus on this problem and propose a mechanism that can detect the conflict origin AS prefix automatically using the policy database.

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BGP integrity check for the conflict origin AS prefix in the Inter-domain routing

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Keywords

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