Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

Pak Hung Au, Keiichi Kawai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

30 Citations (Scopus)


We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)56-78
Number of pages23
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Publication statusPublished - 2020 Jan
Externally publishedYes


  • Bayesian persuasion
  • Information transmission
  • Multiple senders

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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