Congestion Control for a System with Parallel Stations and Homogeneous Customers Using Priority Passes

Yasushi Masuda, Akira Tsuji

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


We consider a game theoretic congestion model with parallel nodes and homogeneous customers. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the priority passes improve social welfare for such a system. To this end, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. The system with no priority pass has a unique equilibrium. With the introduction of priority passes, the uniqueness of the equilibrium may be destroyed. We provide a sufficient condition under which the system with priority passes outperforms the system with no priority passes. The problem is explored numerically as well.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)293-318
Number of pages26
JournalNetworks and Spatial Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Mar 15


  • Capacitated network
  • Congestion game
  • Priority
  • Theme park

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Artificial Intelligence

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