Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets

Morimitsu Kurino

doi:10.1007/s42973-019-00004-z

Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets

Morimitsu Kurino

Faculty of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We introduce a dynamic framework to analyze two-sided matching interactions that occur repeatedly over time, such as teacher–student matching or hospital–intern markets in Britain. We propose a dynamic concept of credible group stability and show that implementing a men-optimal stable matching in each period is credibly group-stable. The result holds for a women-optimal stable matching. A credibly group-stable dynamic matching is individually rational and immune to any defensible group deviations with an appropriate definition of defensibility. We obtain several policy implications for market design. Moreover, a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency is given for finitely repeated markets.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	135-165
Number of pages	31
Journal	Japanese Economic Review
Volume	71
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-019-00004-z
Publication status	Published - 2020 Jan 1

Keywords

Credibility
Dynamic matching market
Efficiency
Group stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s42973-019-00004-z

Cite this

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title = "Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets",

abstract = "We introduce a dynamic framework to analyze two-sided matching interactions that occur repeatedly over time, such as teacher–student matching or hospital–intern markets in Britain. We propose a dynamic concept of credible group stability and show that implementing a men-optimal stable matching in each period is credibly group-stable. The result holds for a women-optimal stable matching. A credibly group-stable dynamic matching is individually rational and immune to any defensible group deviations with an appropriate definition of defensibility. We obtain several policy implications for market design. Moreover, a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency is given for finitely repeated markets.",

keywords = "Credibility, Dynamic matching market, Efficiency, Group stability",

author = "Morimitsu Kurino",

note = "Funding Information: I am very grateful to Onur Kesten and Ted Temzelides, and especially to M. Utku ?nver for their guidance, support and discussions. I thank Masaki Aoyagi, Andreas Blume, Lars Ehlers, Isa E. Hafalir, Bettina Klaus, Hideo Konishi, Rene Saran, a referee and the guest editor of this journal, and seminar participants at Pittsburgh, SED 2008 5th Conference on Economic Design, and 9th International Meeting of the Society of Social Choice and Welfare for comments and discussions. I also thank Thomas Rawski for proofreading the paper. All remaining errors are my own responsibility. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019, Japanese Economic Association.",

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AU - Kurino, Morimitsu

N1 - Funding Information: I am very grateful to Onur Kesten and Ted Temzelides, and especially to M. Utku ?nver for their guidance, support and discussions. I thank Masaki Aoyagi, Andreas Blume, Lars Ehlers, Isa E. Hafalir, Bettina Klaus, Hideo Konishi, Rene Saran, a referee and the guest editor of this journal, and seminar participants at Pittsburgh, SED 2008 5th Conference on Economic Design, and 9th International Meeting of the Society of Social Choice and Welfare for comments and discussions. I also thank Thomas Rawski for proofreading the paper. All remaining errors are my own responsibility. Publisher Copyright: © 2019, Japanese Economic Association.

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Y1 - 2020/1/1

N2 - We introduce a dynamic framework to analyze two-sided matching interactions that occur repeatedly over time, such as teacher–student matching or hospital–intern markets in Britain. We propose a dynamic concept of credible group stability and show that implementing a men-optimal stable matching in each period is credibly group-stable. The result holds for a women-optimal stable matching. A credibly group-stable dynamic matching is individually rational and immune to any defensible group deviations with an appropriate definition of defensibility. We obtain several policy implications for market design. Moreover, a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency is given for finitely repeated markets.

AB - We introduce a dynamic framework to analyze two-sided matching interactions that occur repeatedly over time, such as teacher–student matching or hospital–intern markets in Britain. We propose a dynamic concept of credible group stability and show that implementing a men-optimal stable matching in each period is credibly group-stable. The result holds for a women-optimal stable matching. A credibly group-stable dynamic matching is individually rational and immune to any defensible group deviations with an appropriate definition of defensibility. We obtain several policy implications for market design. Moreover, a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency is given for finitely repeated markets.

KW - Credibility

KW - Dynamic matching market

KW - Efficiency

KW - Group stability

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JO - Japanese Economic Review

JF - Japanese Economic Review

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Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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