Abstract
Consider an individual whose judgments are always based on a fundamental criterion such as a political ideology or a religious doctrine. In a choice situation, he always prefers any alternative that is compatible with the criterion to any that is not. When individuals are allowed to have preference spaces restricted in this manner, we investigate Arrow-consistent domains. We observe that a diversity of attitudes is essential in order to escape an Arrovian impossibility.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 435-445 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2006 Jun |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics