TY - GEN
T1 - Efficient allocation mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints
AU - Suzuki, Takamasa
AU - Tamura, Akihisa
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - We consider an allocation problem of multiple types objects to agents, where each type of an object has multiple copies (e.g., mult iple seats of a school), each agent is endowed with an object, and some distributional constraints are imposed on the allocation (e.g., minimum/maximum quotas). We develop a mechanism that is based on the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, which Is strategy-proof, feasible (always satisfies distributional constraints). Pareto efficient, and individually rational, assuming the distributional constraints are represented as an M-convex set. The class of distributional cons traints we consider contains many situations raised from realistic matching problems, including individual minimum/maximum quot as, regional maximum quotas, type-specific quotas, and distance constraints. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop a mechanism with these desirable properties.
AB - We consider an allocation problem of multiple types objects to agents, where each type of an object has multiple copies (e.g., mult iple seats of a school), each agent is endowed with an object, and some distributional constraints are imposed on the allocation (e.g., minimum/maximum quotas). We develop a mechanism that is based on the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, which Is strategy-proof, feasible (always satisfies distributional constraints). Pareto efficient, and individually rational, assuming the distributional constraints are represented as an M-convex set. The class of distributional cons traints we consider contains many situations raised from realistic matching problems, including individual minimum/maximum quot as, regional maximum quotas, type-specific quotas, and distance constraints. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop a mechanism with these desirable properties.
KW - Controlled school choice
KW - Distributional constraints
KW - M-convex set
KW - Strategy-proofness
KW - Top trading cycles mechanism
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85055325446
SN - 9781510868083
T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
SP - 50
EP - 67
BT - 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
T2 - 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018
Y2 - 10 July 2018 through 15 July 2018
ER -