Abstract
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, each year college freshmen move in and seniors move out of on-campus housing. Each student stays on campus for only a few years. A student is a "newcomer" in the beginning and then becomes an "existing tenant." Motivated by this observation, we introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping generations. In terms of a dynamic rule without monetary transfers, we examine two static rules of serial dictatorship and top trading cycles. We support these seniority-based rules in terms of their dynamic Pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 258-289 |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Journal | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue number | 1 D |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)