How an ineffective agent can increase his budget

Kimiko Terai, Amihai Glazer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


A principal aware that an agent exerts little effort will nevertheless fund the agent, because the principal values the output the agent produces. The agent in turn decides how hard to work by anticipating how his behavior affects the budget the principal will give him. Under some conditions, the principal gives the agent large budgets anticipating that the agent will not work hard. The corrupt environment aggravates the problem. An agent who can set the budget ameliorates the problem, though incompletely.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)133-147
Number of pages15
JournalEconomics and Politics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2021 Mar


  • budget
  • construction industry
  • corruption
  • effort
  • investment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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