On the neutrality of coalition formation in a pure bargaining problem

Haruo Imai, Naoki Watanabe

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


We consider the sequential bargaining game à la Stahl-Binmore-Rubinstein with random proposers, juxtaposing an ex ante coalition formation stage to their bargaining game. On the basis of the expected outcomes in the negotiation over how to split a dollar, players can form coalitions in a sequential manner, within each of which they can redistribute their payoffs. It turns out that the grand coalition does form, and that each player receives his discounted expected payoff, which is obtained by playing as a single player in the negotiation, although there could be many equilibria in the bargaining stage.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)352-362
Number of pages11
JournalJapanese Economic Review
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2005 Sept 1
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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