On the operation of multiple matching markets

Hidekazu Anno; Morimitsu Kurino

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.001

On the operation of multiple matching markets

Hidekazu Anno, Morimitsu Kurino

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We provide a new perspective on how to operate matching markets when there are many types of markets. Our finding is that the market-wise adaptation of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the market-wise use of the well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles and the deferred acceptance. This result gives theoretical support to the independent operation of markets observed in real-life markets as well as our practice in Market Design that separately treats each market for its design.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	166-185
Number of pages	20
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	100
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.001
Publication status	Published - 2016 Nov 1
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Deferred acceptance rules
Market design
Second-best incentive compatibility
Strategy-proofness
Top trading cycles rules

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.001

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abstract = "We provide a new perspective on how to operate matching markets when there are many types of markets. Our finding is that the market-wise adaptation of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the market-wise use of the well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles and the deferred acceptance. This result gives theoretical support to the independent operation of markets observed in real-life markets as well as our practice in Market Design that separately treats each market for its design.",

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AU - Kurino, Morimitsu

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AB - We provide a new perspective on how to operate matching markets when there are many types of markets. Our finding is that the market-wise adaptation of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the market-wise use of the well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles and the deferred acceptance. This result gives theoretical support to the independent operation of markets observed in real-life markets as well as our practice in Market Design that separately treats each market for its design.

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KW - Second-best incentive compatibility

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

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On the operation of multiple matching markets

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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