TY - JOUR
T1 - Robust supply chain network equilibrium model
AU - Hirano, Tatsuya
AU - Narushima, Yasushi
N1 - Funding Information:
Funding: This research is supported in part by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI [Grants 17K00039 and 18K11179].
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 INFORMS
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - An important and often researched area of management science is mathematical modeling of a supply chain. Competitive situations can occur in supply chains owing to the involvement of multiple decision makers (players) that independently decide their behaviors. To investigate competitive supply chain networks, a supply chain network equilibrium (SCNE) model was proposed. Recently, particular attention has been paid to risk management of a supply chain. In equilibrium models, it is vital to consider players' decisions and interdependence relations. Thus, we consider competitive supply chain networks with uncertainties in the other players' strategies. In the proposed model, each player cannot know exactly the other players' strategies, and they decide their strategy using the minimax principle (that is, assuming the worst case). We call it the robust SCNE model. We formulate the robust SCNE model as a variational inequality problem (VIP) in which the set associated with the VIP is constructed by second-order cone constraints. We show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium under mild assumptions. In addition, we give, in a special case, some relations between players' strategies in the equilibrium and magnitudes of uncertainties. Finally, some numerical results are provided.
AB - An important and often researched area of management science is mathematical modeling of a supply chain. Competitive situations can occur in supply chains owing to the involvement of multiple decision makers (players) that independently decide their behaviors. To investigate competitive supply chain networks, a supply chain network equilibrium (SCNE) model was proposed. Recently, particular attention has been paid to risk management of a supply chain. In equilibrium models, it is vital to consider players' decisions and interdependence relations. Thus, we consider competitive supply chain networks with uncertainties in the other players' strategies. In the proposed model, each player cannot know exactly the other players' strategies, and they decide their strategy using the minimax principle (that is, assuming the worst case). We call it the robust SCNE model. We formulate the robust SCNE model as a variational inequality problem (VIP) in which the set associated with the VIP is constructed by second-order cone constraints. We show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium under mild assumptions. In addition, we give, in a special case, some relations between players' strategies in the equilibrium and magnitudes of uncertainties. Finally, some numerical results are provided.
KW - Existence
KW - Robust optimization
KW - Supply chain network equilibrium model
KW - Transportation
KW - Uniqueness
KW - Variational inequality problem
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U2 - 10.1287/trsc.2018.0843
DO - 10.1287/trsc.2018.0843
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85071873720
SN - 0041-1655
VL - 53
SP - 1196
EP - 1212
JO - Transportation Science
JF - Transportation Science
IS - 4
ER -