Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem

Keisuke Bando, Ryo Kawasaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


We show that the core of a generalized assignment problem satisfies two types of stability properties. First, the core is the unique stable set defined using the weak domination relation when outcomes are restricted to individually rational and pairwise feasible ones. Second, the core is the unique stable set with respect to a sequential domination relation that is defined by a sequence of weak domination relations that satisfy outsider independence. An equivalent way of stating this result is that the core satisfies the property commonly stated as the existence of a path to stability. These results add to the importance of the core in an assignment problem where agents' preferences may not be quasilinear.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)211-223
Number of pages13
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Publication statusPublished - 2021 Nov
Externally publishedYes


  • Core
  • Generalized assignment problem
  • Path to stability
  • Stable set

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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