Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule

Toyotaka Sakai, Takuma Wakayama

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


In the division problem with single-peaked preferences, an allocation rule is strategy-proof for same tops if no one can gain by reporting a false preference relation having the true peak. This new condition is so weak that it is implied by strategy-proofness and tops-only. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying this mild property under efficiency and envy-freeness. We then analyze how largely the preference domain can be extended with admitting a rule satisfying the three axioms, and show that the single-plateaued domain is the unique such maximal domain.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)287-301
Number of pages15
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Mar


  • Strategy-proofness
  • Strategy-proofness for same tops
  • Tops-only
  • Uniform rule

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Decision Sciences
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • General Social Sciences
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications


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