Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements

Masaki Iimura; Seiji Murakoshi; Toru Hokari

Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements

Masaki Iimura, Seiji Murakoshi, Toru Hokari

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Jackson and Watts (2002, J Econ Theory) study a dynamic process of network formation assuming that each player is myopic. In this note, we study the same dynamic process but assume that each player is farsighted. In particular, we consider a finite-horizon version of such a dynamic process in a model of market sharing agreements introduced by Belleframme and Bloch (2004, Int Econ Review), an investigate which networks are likely to be realized when the number of the players is three.

Original language	English
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Volume	3
Issue number	7
Publication status	Published - 2007 Jan 25
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

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title = "Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements",

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N2 - Jackson and Watts (2002, J Econ Theory) study a dynamic process of network formation assuming that each player is myopic. In this note, we study the same dynamic process but assume that each player is farsighted. In particular, we consider a finite-horizon version of such a dynamic process in a model of market sharing agreements introduced by Belleframme and Bloch (2004, Int Econ Review), an investigate which networks are likely to be realized when the number of the players is three.

AB - Jackson and Watts (2002, J Econ Theory) study a dynamic process of network formation assuming that each player is myopic. In this note, we study the same dynamic process but assume that each player is farsighted. In particular, we consider a finite-horizon version of such a dynamic process in a model of market sharing agreements introduced by Belleframme and Bloch (2004, Int Econ Review), an investigate which networks are likely to be realized when the number of the players is three.

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Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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