An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

Noriaki Okamoto

doi:10.1257/aer.20160970

An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

Noriaki Okamoto

経済学部

研究成果: Article › 査読

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium.

本文言語	English
ページ（範囲）	555-560
ページ数	6
ジャーナル	American Economic Review
巻	108
号	2
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160970
出版ステータス	Published - 2018 2月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

経済学、計量経済学

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10.1257/aer.20160970

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An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

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