An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism

David Hugh-Jones, Morimitsu Kurino, Christoph Vanberg

研究成果: Article査読

9 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences truthfully. However, the mechanism is not strategy-proof, so participants may not truthfully report their preferences. We investigate misreporting in a set of simple applications of the PS mechanism. We confront subjects with situations in which the theory suggests that there is an incentive or no incentive to misreport. We find little misreporting in situations where misreporting is a Nash equilibrium. However, we also find a significant degree of misreporting in situations where there is actually no benefit to doing so. These findings suggest that the PS mechanism may have problems in terms of truthful elicitation.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)367-380
ページ数14
ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
87
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2014 9月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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