Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

Pak Hung Au, Keiichi Kawai

研究成果: Article査読

30 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)56-78
ページ数23
ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
119
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2020 1月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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