Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

Pak Hung Au; Keiichi Kawai

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002

Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

Pak Hung Au
, Keiichi Kawai

研究成果: Article › 査読

41 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

本文言語	English
ページ（範囲）	56-78
ページ数	23
ジャーナル	Games and Economic Behavior
巻	119
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002
出版ステータス	Published - 2020 1月
外部発表	はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

財務
経済学、計量経済学

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10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002

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引用スタイル

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title = "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders",

abstract = "We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.",

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AB - We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

KW - Bayesian persuasion

KW - Information transmission

KW - Multiple senders

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85074068419

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Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

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