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Cost-based pricing in government procurements with unobservable cost-reducing actions and productivity

研究成果: Article › 査読

1   !!Link opens in a new tab 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The effective and efficient implementation of government procurement improves social welfare, however, governments and policymakers struggle to refine contract arrangements. To investigate the optimal contract scheme, we analyze a hybrid model of moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that the contract price is higher when the firm’s cost–reducing capacity is unobservable than when it is observable. Moreover, the effect of the unobservability of the firm’s cost–reducing capacity becomes more severe as the information asymmetry between the government and the firm increases. We contribute to the literature by clarifying how information asymmetry leads to higher contract prices.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)373-390
ページ数18
ジャーナルAsia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics
巻30
号2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2023
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 会計
  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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