TY - JOUR
T1 - Cost-based pricing in government procurements with unobservable cost-reducing actions and productivity
AU - Kimura, Taichi
AU - Morimitsu, Takahiro
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 City University of Hong Kong and National Taiwan University.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - The effective and efficient implementation of government procurement improves social welfare, however, governments and policymakers struggle to refine contract arrangements. To investigate the optimal contract scheme, we analyze a hybrid model of moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that the contract price is higher when the firm’s cost–reducing capacity is unobservable than when it is observable. Moreover, the effect of the unobservability of the firm’s cost–reducing capacity becomes more severe as the information asymmetry between the government and the firm increases. We contribute to the literature by clarifying how information asymmetry leads to higher contract prices.
AB - The effective and efficient implementation of government procurement improves social welfare, however, governments and policymakers struggle to refine contract arrangements. To investigate the optimal contract scheme, we analyze a hybrid model of moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that the contract price is higher when the firm’s cost–reducing capacity is unobservable than when it is observable. Moreover, the effect of the unobservability of the firm’s cost–reducing capacity becomes more severe as the information asymmetry between the government and the firm increases. We contribute to the literature by clarifying how information asymmetry leads to higher contract prices.
KW - cost–based pricing
KW - cost–plus–incentive–fee contract
KW - fixed–price contract
KW - Government procurement
KW - information asymmetry
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85115606224
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85115606224#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1080/16081625.2021.1930942
DO - 10.1080/16081625.2021.1930942
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85115606224
SN - 1608-1625
VL - 30
SP - 373
EP - 390
JO - Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics
JF - Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics
IS - 2
ER -