抄録
We consider a set of players who have to make a joint decision under uncertainty and learn via gradient dynamics how to reach the maximal profit for the coalition while the game is running and the revenue gets allocated to the players. The main result is the convergence of the intertwined learning-allocation dynamics to a stable solution which yields the maximal profit for the coalition and a stable allocation in the core of the asymptotic game.
| 本文言語 | English |
|---|---|
| ページ(範囲) | 31-36 |
| ページ数 | 6 |
| ジャーナル | IFAC-PapersOnLine |
| 巻 | 58 |
| 号 | 30 |
| DOI | |
| 出版ステータス | Published - 2024 12月 1 |
| イベント | 5th IFAC Workshop on Cyber-Physical Human Systems, CPHS 2024 - Antalya, Turkey 継続期間: 2024 12月 12 → 2024 12月 13 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 制御およびシステム工学
フィンガープリント
「Learning-Allocation Dynamics in Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。引用スタイル
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