Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game

Miyu Yoshihara; Toru Namerikawa; Zhihua Qu

doi:10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699

Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game

Miyu Yoshihara, Toru Namerikawa, Zhihua Qu

システムデザイン工学科

研究成果: Conference contribution

6 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we deal with the charging scheduling optimization problem of electric vehicle using Stackelberg game. Stackelberg game is one of game theory classified as hierarchical, repeating, and non-cooperative game. The charging station determines the price to maximize its own profit from selling energy and each EV determines the energy demand to maximize the charge benefit by competing with other EVs. At this time, we guarantee that Nash equilibrium exists within the EV group. Finally, using numerical simulation, we show that the game reaches an Stackelberg equilibrium.

本文言語	English
ホスト出版物のタイトル	2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018
出版社	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ページ	1658-1663
ページ数	6
ISBN（電子版）	9784907764609
DOI	https://doi.org/10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699
出版ステータス	Published - 2018 10月 15
イベント	57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018 - Nara, Japan 継続期間: 2018 9月 11 → 2018 9月 14

出版物シリーズ

名前	2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018

Other

Other	57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018
国/地域	Japan
City	Nara
Period	18/9/11 → 18/9/14

ASJC Scopus subject areas

制御およびシステム工学
制御と最適化
器械工学

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10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699

他のファイルとリンク

引用スタイル

Yoshihara, M., Namerikawa, T., & Qu, Z. (2018). Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game. In 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018 (pp. 1658-1663). Article 8492699 (2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699

Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game. / Yoshihara, Miyu; Namerikawa, Toru; Qu, Zhihua.
2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 1658-1663 8492699 (2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018).

研究成果: Conference contribution

Yoshihara, M, Namerikawa, T & Qu, Z 2018, Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game. in 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018., 8492699, 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1658-1663, 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018, Nara, Japan, 18/9/11. https://doi.org/10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699

Yoshihara M, Namerikawa T, Qu Z. Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game. In 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 1658-1663. 8492699. (2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018). doi: 10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699

Yoshihara, Miyu ; Namerikawa, Toru ; Qu, Zhihua. / Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game. 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 1658-1663 (2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018).

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abstract = "In this paper, we deal with the charging scheduling optimization problem of electric vehicle using Stackelberg game. Stackelberg game is one of game theory classified as hierarchical, repeating, and non-cooperative game. The charging station determines the price to maximize its own profit from selling energy and each EV determines the energy demand to maximize the charge benefit by competing with other EVs. At this time, we guarantee that Nash equilibrium exists within the EV group. Finally, using numerical simulation, we show that the game reaches an Stackelberg equilibrium.",

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Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game

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