@article{e58cede5750f4b23aa3d12cf6087304f,
title = "Public goods game with ambiguous threshold",
abstract = "Various collective action problems can be described as a discrete public goods game with a threshold. In this game, players may be reluctant to contribute to the provision of public goods when the threshold value is uncertain. We derive equilibria when players face ambiguity (i.e., Knightian uncertainty) on the threshold value by using Choquet expected utility. Furthermore, we show that in a class of neo-additive capacities, an increase in ambiguity decreases the equilibrium maximal number of contributors, irrespective of players{\textquoteright} ambiguity-attitudes. This contrasts to what McBride (2006) shows when the probability distribution is known.",
keywords = "Ambiguity, Choquet expected utility, Collective action, Public goods",
author = "Daiki Kishishita and Hiroyuki Ozaki",
note = "Funding Information: Kishishita {\textquoteright}s work is supported by JSPS Japan Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Research Fellows ( 17J02113 ) and Ozaki{\textquoteright}s work is partially supported by JSPS Japan KAKENHI Grant Number JP19K01550 . Both authors are very grateful to the editor of the journal and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions, which largely improved both of the contents and exposition of the paper. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2020",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109165",
language = "English",
volume = "191",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
}