Second price auctions on general preference domains: Two characterizations

研究成果: Article査読

32 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Auction theory usually assumes the quasi-linearity of individual preferences. We drop this assumption and define an extension of second price mechanisms that applies to general preferences. It turns out that the extended second price mechanisms are the only rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and a mild non-imposition property. Their definition is simple just as much as the definition of usual second price mechanisms: everyone reports his maximum willingness to pay and the bidder whose reported value is highest buys the auctioned object for the price equal to the second highest reported value. The characterization is valid if efficiency is replaced by envy-freeness.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)347-356
ページ数10
ジャーナルEconomic Theory
37
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2008 11月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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