Teams do inflict costly third-party punishment as individuals do: Experimental evidence

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Initiated by the seminal work of Fehr and Fischbacher (Evolution and Human Behavior (2004)), a large body of research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. This paper shows in an experimental setting that this behavioral finding extends to a situation where a pair of individuals jointly decides how strong a third-party punishment to impose. It also shows that this punishment behavior is robust to the size of social distance within pairs. These results lend useful insight since decisions in our everyday lives and also in courts are often made by teams.

本文言語English
論文番号22
ジャーナルGames
12
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2021 3月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性
  • 応用数学

フィンガープリント

「Teams do inflict costly third-party punishment as individuals do: Experimental evidence」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル