抄録
Initiated by the seminal work of Fehr and Fischbacher (Evolution and Human Behavior (2004)), a large body of research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. This paper shows in an experimental setting that this behavioral finding extends to a situation where a pair of individuals jointly decides how strong a third-party punishment to impose. It also shows that this punishment behavior is robust to the size of social distance within pairs. These results lend useful insight since decisions in our everyday lives and also in courts are often made by teams.
本文言語 | English |
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論文番号 | 22 |
ジャーナル | Games |
巻 | 12 |
号 | 1 |
DOI | |
出版ステータス | Published - 2021 3月 |
外部発表 | はい |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 統計学および確率
- 統計学、確率および不確実性
- 応用数学