抄録
In a one-principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal's interest if the agents supply substitutes. It can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed.
| 本文言語 | English |
|---|---|
| ページ（範囲） | 1179-1219 |
| ページ数 | 41 |
| ジャーナル | Econometrica |
| 巻 | 72 |
| 号 | 4 |
| DOI | |
| 出版ステータス | Published - 2004 7月 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 経済学、計量経済学