Under What Conditions Does the Manager Withhold Segment Information?

Yutaro Murakami, Atsushi Shiiba

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

This paper considers how a manager decides to disclose or withhold segment information in a capital market setting. In particular, we develop a multi-period model in which a manager in each period decides how to allocate her effort between two businesses. The profit earned in each segment is determined by the manager’s effort and ability as well as each segment’s market profitability and inherent uncertainty. In this setting, in contrast to the expectation of segment disclosure being withheld due to conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, we identify the conditions under which the manager rationally withholds segment information and achieves higher social welfare. In a setting where the manager is concerned about the current stock price, disclosing more disaggregated information to the stock market does not necessarily lead to more efficient monitoring. The capital market values various segment earnings differently, and in response to this valuation, a rational manager may greatly alter her behavior, leading to inefficient outcomes.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)1009-1038
ページ数30
ジャーナルJournal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
38
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2023 10月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 会計
  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(その他)

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