TY - JOUR
T1 - Voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
AU - Fujiwara-Greve, Takako
AU - Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements. We are very grateful to Nobue Suzuki for her constant help. We also appreciate useful comments from the editor, Juuso Välimäki, two anonymous referees, Akihiko Matsui, Chiaki Hara, Masahiro Ashiya, Mamoru Kaneko, Masaki Aoyagi, Marcus Berliant, Henrich Greve, and seminar participants at KIER, Kyoto University, Keio University, University of Tokyo, University of Tsukuba, Hitotsubashi University, and Symposium on Market Quality (Keio University, Tokyo, December 2005). All errors are ours. This work was supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Priority Areas, No.12124204.
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - Ordinary repeated games do not apply to real societies where one can cheat and escape from partners. We formulate a model of endogenous relationships that a player can unilaterally end and start with a randomly assigned new partner with no information flow. Focusing on two-person, two-action Prisoner's Dilemma, we show that the endogenous duration of partnerships generates a significantly different evolutionary stability structure from ordinary random matching games. Monomorphic equilibria require initial trust building, while a polymorphic equilibrium includes earlier cooperators than any strategy in monomorphic equilibria and is thus more efficient. This is due to the non-linearity of average payoffs.
AB - Ordinary repeated games do not apply to real societies where one can cheat and escape from partners. We formulate a model of endogenous relationships that a player can unilaterally end and start with a randomly assigned new partner with no information flow. Focusing on two-person, two-action Prisoner's Dilemma, we show that the endogenous duration of partnerships generates a significantly different evolutionary stability structure from ordinary random matching games. Monomorphic equilibria require initial trust building, while a polymorphic equilibrium includes earlier cooperators than any strategy in monomorphic equilibria and is thus more efficient. This is due to the non-linearity of average payoffs.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/67549118629
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/67549118629#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00539.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00539.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:67549118629
SN - 0034-6527
VL - 76
SP - 993
EP - 1021
JO - Review of Economic Studies
JF - Review of Economic Studies
IS - 3
ER -